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BACKGROUND

THE SITUATION IN IRAN

Status of Communist penetration of Iranian military establishments

- I. In April 1953 a commission of high-ranking Iranian officers estimated 1,600 Tudeh members in armed forces, 900 in the Army, 300 in the Air Force and 200 each in the Military College and Military High School.
- II. Iranian army intelligence has long shown awareness of Tudeh activity in army and is familiar with Tudeh army officers organization and has identified various individuals involved.
- III. Iranian G-2, Colonel Pakravan, has been in charge of ferreting out Tudeh in the Army. Several hundred army officers, non-coms and soldiers have been arrested. In G-2's office four officers out of a total of sixty, and 20 non-coms out of a total of 25 to 30 have been removed for suspected Tudeh sympathies. Of those arrested around 250 non-commissioned officers have reportedly been summarily dismissed from the service after their arrest, others have been exiled. At least sixty officers who were under arrest, presented a problem because the documentary proof of their complicity in the Tudeh party was "mysteriously missing" from G-2 files.

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IV. Attention was drawn particularly to Tudeh infiltration of the Air Force on 22 September when Communist sympathizers succeeded in temporarily sabotaging 13 planes.

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V. The Iranian Chief of Staff, in October, asked

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for a list of Communists known ~~as~~ by

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to be in the Iranian army. He said that he could not locate his own list.

VI. In early November 1953 Iranian G-2 remarked that only a small proportion of Party members or sympathizers in the army have been known or apprehended. In later statements he has been more optimistic, although there is no convincing evidence that the situation has changed markedly.

VII. It probably is true that current Iranian army efforts to remove Communist sympathizers are more widespread and more successful than during ~~the~~ Mossadeq's regime. However, the army has neither the the experience knowledge, nor the organization to do an effective job.

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